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Virtue epistemology became the dominant 
viewpoint in contemporary epistemology in the last 
10-20 years. At the same time there has been a surge 
of interest in virtue epistemology (VE) among 
philosophers of education and various education 
practitioners (see Moran, 2011, Ortwein, 2012, 
Nurullin, 2014). This is explained by the fact that VE 
has normative, prescriptive character unlike 
“traditional” epistemology which was mainly 
descriptive. VE explores what knowledge should be 
like to be called knowledge and not just true belief. 
Different researches tried to explore how virtue 
epistemology could help in answering the traditional 
questions about goals and methods of education. This 
raised some theoretical and practical challenges. In 
this article we will concentrate on two main 
questions. First of all, what are intellectual virtues 
and what is their role in education? Secondly, how 
can they be taught? In answering those questions 
researchers assume one or the other version of VE. 
For philosophers of education it is standard to assume 
the responsibilist version of VE because it focuses on 
traits that can be fostered and developed. The 
reliabilist approach was initially aimed at solving the 
Gettier problem and skeptical challenge. 
Nevertheless, some proponents of VE explore the 
practical implications of virtue reliabilism for 
education. We suggest that it is not necessary to 
choose between one or the other of these approaches. 
In analyzing education these approaches do not 
conflict with each other. Rather they focus on 
different dimensions of education. Virtue reliabilism 
helps analyze the epistemology of education 
generally, define final goals of education, and offers 
a general framework of analyzing education. Virtue 
responsibilist approach focuses on more specific 
goals of education and means of achieving them. In 
this article we will draw on both approaches. At the 
end of the article we will explore practical issues 
which arise in educating intellectual virtues. 
Particularly, we will address the role of cooperation 
and interaction between students in educating 
cognitive faculties and intellectual traits in Russian 
tradition “developmental education”. 
 
2. Virtue reliabilism and education. 
What does it mean to know something? 
Traditional epistemology focused on knowledge as 
the end result of cognition and analyzed it separately 
from the knower. G.Frege and K.Popper even 
defended the view that knowledge exists somehow 
separately from mind and comprises the third realm 
of reality in addition to physical reality and 
subjective reality. Mathematical and logical truths, 
knowledge of laws of nature exist as true 
propositions outside of time and space: they were 
always true and will forever be true. As such, 
epistemology was of little interest to the philosophy 
of education. From this point of view the only thing 
you had to secure was that the knowledge that 
teachers passed to their students was genuine, true 
knowledge. VE makes a sharp turn from this view. 
The central issue for VE is cognitive agency: who is 
it that knows? What’s the difference between people 
who correctly answer a certain question, say the 
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square root of 9? Suppose one of them found the 
answer in Internet or asked a friend, the other picked 
a lucky guess, while the third performed the 
calculation herself. All of them report correctly, but 
intuitively it seems that only the latter has genuine 
knowledge. What makes the last case different? 
E.Sosa proposed the archery metaphor for knowledge 
(Sosa, 2007). In many respects knowing is like 
archery. You make a claim and if it’s true, you “hit 
the target” in bull’s-eye. But a successful hit is not 
enough to be a good archer. The archer must manifest 
relevant skill. But even that’s not enough. Suppose 
that a skillful archer shoots the target, but then a 
powerful gust of wind diverts the arrow, so that it 
misses the target. Suppose also that a second gust of 
wind pushes the arrow back on the right course and it 
finally hits the target. In that case, the shot would be 
successful, the archer manifested relevant skill, but 
the success of the shot was not due to the skill. The 
shot is not apt, it is not creditable to the archer, but to 
whimsical conditions of nature. To summarize, the 
archer’s shot can be assessed in three different 
respects: 1) whether it was accurate, 2) whether it 
was skillful, or adroit, and 3) whether it was apt – 
accurate because it was adroit. Sosa calls this the 
AAA-structure. Beliefs also fall under the AAA-
structure. According to Sosa, beliefs are 
performances, a special type of epistemic 
performance. We can speak about 1) the accuracy of 
belief, i.e. its truth, 2) its adroitness, i.e. whether it 
manifests epistemic virtue or competence and 3) 
aptness of belief, i.e. whether it’s true because it is 
competent. Going back to our example, it is now 
clear why only the latter student really knew the 
square root of 9. The others satisfied the accuracy 
condition but didn’t satisfy the adroitness and aptness 
condition. The cognitive success of the latter student 
was due to exercise of his ability. Virtue reliabilist 
claims that reliable abilities or faculties are epistemic 
or cognitive virtues. Therefore, belief that is 
attributed to exercise of ability is a virtuous belief. 
This account of knowledge correspondingly shifts the 
goals of education generally to form apt beliefs and 
not just true beliefs. The importance of acquiring apt 
beliefs becomes especially manifest when the 
epistemic environment is unfriendly as, e.g. in the 
Internet, where the student has to be very careful 
where to look for answers. The other danger is that 
the epistemic environment becomes too friendly 
when the teacher undermines the students’ own 
incentive to look for answers. An example would be 
when the teacher in philosophy class informs students 
about all forms of argumentation pro and contra a 
given thesis in the history of philosophy before the 
students have the chance to think and choose for 
themselves. In this case, it is better for the teacher to 
wait till the students come with an argument of their 
own and only then to inform them of other known 
arguments. In light of this discussion of the role of 
the teacher one more epistemological question must 
be answered. Should a person have a first-person 
access to justification for her beliefs? Should 
knowledge be reflective? Should first-order 
knowledge be accompanied by corresponding meta-
level knowledge? Sosa develops his conception of 
meta-competence to explain what he calls reflective 
knowledge (Sosa, 2007, 2008). Let’s use again the 
analogy with the hunter. The hunter is different from 
the archer because the hunter must be careful in 
picking his shots. He needs to know when, where and 
in what conditions to shoot in order to hit his target 
successfully. And, more importantly, he needs to 
know when to withhold from shooting. For example, 
if the external conditions are not appropriate (there is 
a thick fog, for example), it would be wise to abstain 
from shooting in order to avoid failure, or even 
worse, accidentally shoot another man. In such case, 
though the hunter will abstain from shooting, his 
performance will nevertheless  still be apt. To convert 
this example in the epistemology terms, one’s first-
order knowledge must be guided by the appropriate 
meta-level reflective knowledge. The reflective 
knowledge is in effect the competency which guides 
the knower whether he should form a belief at all on 
the question at issue, or should rather withhold. A 
belief is fully apt when the reflective knowledge 
guides the first-order apt belief so that it is apt. In 
such case, Sosa says the subject knows full well. 
Reflective knowledge presupposes that we not only 
know something, but that we also know that we know 
it. Different educational theorists wrote about the 
importance of meta-knowledge and meta-cognition 
(Flavell, Miller & Miller, 2002, Argyris, 1999). The 
idea is that students think not only about solving the 
problem at hand, but think about thinking. 
 
3. Social knowledge and education. 
Many beliefs that students acquire in the 
classroom are taken for granted based on the 
authority of the teacher. Clearly, testimonial 
knowledge is not grounded in exercise of cognitive 
ability and, hence, would not be virtuous. Should 
students question or somehow re-discover for 
themselves everything their professors tell them? 
This would be implausible and impractical. There are 
two possible ways a virtue epistemologist may 
answer this question. One is to straightforwardly 
deny the status of knowledge for testimonial 
knowledge. This implies several consequences that 
are hard to swallow. A lot of knowledge that we think 
we have from school or university would not be real 
knowledge. It would undermine the important role of 
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the teacher as a keeper and translator of knowledge to 
future generations. It would also ignore what H. 
Putnam called the division of epistemic labor. One 
cannot know everything. There are areas of expertise 
and competent experts in those areas. Specifically, 
teachers are supposed to be competent experts in 
their areas and we defer to them for their knowledge 
and expertise and expect them to share their 
knowledge with us. One way to answer this challenge 
is to attribute less to cognitive ability and more to the 
epistemic environment. Recall Sosa’s archer 
metaphor. The role of the wind which pushed the 
arrow first away and then back on the right course 
may be interpreted to show that environment plays a 
negative role in assessment of the aptness of the shot. 
But the shot could not be apt in the first place if the 
environment were not sufficiently friendly, e.g. in 
case of a hurricane. It would just always miss the 
target no matter what the skill is. The same goes for 
belief-formation. If the knower is surrounded by total 
propaganda and has no choice what to believe in, any 
exercise of cognitive ability, however reliable, will 
lead to false beliefs. So, the appropriate environment 
is a necessary condition for successful exercise of a 
cognitive ability and, hence, a prerequisite for 
forming a virtuous belief. Classroom environment is 
supposed to be epistemically friendly and forming 
beliefs in such environment seems epistemically 
virtuous. Another way to defend VE against the 
challenge of testimonial knowledge is to claim that 
knowledge by itself is not enough – there must be 
understanding. Understanding as a category of 
epistemology was overlooked for quite some time, 
and treated with suspicion because of its subjective 
character. Only lately epistemologists turned their 
eyes to it (see Pritchard, 2009 and Pritchard, Grimm, 
2006). But it is clear that knowledge and 
understanding can come apart as in the case of 
someone learning the square root of 9 from the 
Internet. In epistemically friendly environment one 
can gain knowledge without corresponding 
understanding. In this caseб one can have passive 
knowledge without contributing anything as a 
cognitive agent, whereas when one also tries to 
understand something they can save themselves from 
false conclusions in case the epistemic environment 
is unfriendly. Understanding coupled with knowledge 
ensures attaining cognitive achievement because then 
knowledge can be credited to the knower. The ideas 
of cognitive achievement and credit are key ideas in 
VE. Knowledge does not only have instrumental 
value. It is not only needed to earn high grades or 
secure a good job. Knowledge can be valuable for its 
own sake. If we deserve credit for our knowledge, it 
becomes our achievement. Attaining knowledge is 
delightful. Of course, not every piece of knowledge 
that we have can be credited to us. Most of it is 
credited to famous scientists and our teachers. 
Nevertheless, the idea that knowledge is a form of 
achievement, something which is worthy of credit 
can be very fruitful for purposes of forming 
educational strategies. Usually, in our market-based 
society the purpose of education and acquisition of 
knowledge is seen to prepare a workforce that would 
sell on the market. Possessing a degree from a 
prestigious university is looked at as a step into 
higher social class. Not denying the role of education 
as a social lift it is important to note that the 
instrumentalist approach to knowledge leads to 
degradation of education. Scoring a high grade as a 
sole purpose of learning tends to make students focus 
only on what is necessary to get the grade. This view 
undermines self-education, the student doesn’t learn 
to set herself educational goals beyond what is 
required by the curriculum. Viewing education and 
knowledge as simply means to an end is a source for 
cheating and plagiarism in education and academic 
spheres. 
 
4. Virtue responsibilism and education. 
Another route in understanding virtue is taken 
by virtue responsibilism. Going back to Aristotle, 
L.Zagzebski redefined intellectual virtues as traits of 
intellectual character. She defined knowledge as ‘… 
a state of cognitive contact with reality arising out of 
acts of intellectual virtue’ (Zagzebski, 1996, p.298). 
Among intellectual virtues she lists “intellectual 
carefulness, perseverance, humility, vigor, flexibility, 
courage ... open-mindedness, fair-mindedness, 
insightfulness ... [and] ... intellectual integrity” in 
addition to “ ... the virtues opposed to wishful 
thinking, obtuseness and conformity” (Zagzebski, 
1996, p.155). In answer to the problem of testimonial 
knowledge, a virtue responsibilist can say that there 
are virtues of the testimony-giver (sincerity, fairness, 
charity) and virtues of the testimony-taker (open-
mindedness, critical assessment). If both, the 
testimony-giver and the testimony-taker, are 
epistemically virtuous, testimony leads to real 
knowledge. Why is it not enough just to rely on 
cognitive abilities as virtues? The answer is that 
relying on cognitive abilities alone does not make 
one a virtuous knower. As an example, the Soviet 
Union had rather good education and science, but 
having good Soviet education – knowing math, 
physics and chemistry – did not make one good 
knower because in their everyday lives Soviet 
citizens, some of them otherwise brilliant minds, 
believed blindly in the communist propaganda. What 
they lacked, obviously, is what would now be called 
intellectual virtue, virtuous intellectual character. 
Before we delve further into the notion of intellectual 
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character, it should be noted that the definition of 
intellectual virtue and intellectual character is 
contextual. In a very narrow and strict religious 
society such trait as open-mindedness could be 
considered as vice, and unwavering belief in 
authority could be considered as a prime virtue. Still, 
there is more or less general agreement between 
different scholars as to the list of intellectual virtues 
and vices. Zagzebski modelled her theory on 
Aristotelian understanding of intellectual virtue, but 
unlike Aristotle she subsumes intellectual virtue 
under moral virtue. This makes intellectual virtue as a 
sub-category of moral virtue in the sphere of 
cognition. Intellectual virtues are considered as a 
mean between extremes, just as moral virtues. For 
example, open-mindedness would be a mean between 
gullibility and dogmatism. Intellectual courage is a 
mean between intellectual rashness and intellectual 
cowardice. Zagzebski does not arrange intellectual 
virtues in a hierarchy but one can wonder if there is 
some cardinal intellectual virtue. And if there is one, 
it would be one of the prime goals of education to 
foster and develop it. One answer is that no 
intellectual virtue is above the others but they all 
come in together, i.e. you cannot have one without all 
the others. We believe that this is a strong claim that 
is hard to defend. Rather, we should find among 
intellectual virtues one that presupposes them all. The 
best candidate for this role is intellectual autonomy. 
Intellectual autonomy is usually defined as ability to 
think for yourself, make decisions on your own. It 
seems that at least all full age people have intellectual 
autonomy, because otherwise they couldn’t legally 
marry, sign contracts, etc. It is true that there is some 
base intellectual autonomy, but beyond that it comes 
in degrees. The importance of intellectual autonomy 
was stressed by various philosophers and above all 
Immanuel Kant. In his famous essay “What is 
Enlightenment?” he defines it as “emergence from… 
self-imposed nonage (Unmündigkeit). Nonage is the 
inability to use one's own understanding without 
another's guidance. This nonage is self-imposed if its 
cause lies not in lack of understanding but in 
indecision and lack of courage to use one's own mind 
without another's guidance. Dare to know! (Sapere 
aude). ‘Have the courage to use your own 
understanding’, is therefore the motto of the 
enlightenment” (Kant, 1997). “Unmündigkeit” is also 
translated as immaturity. Here Kant talks about 
people who lived to a certain age, grown-ups, who 
possibly acquired different kinds of knowledge, but 
who are still immature. They still cannot or are not 
willing to think for themselves. They trust someone 
else to do it for them. What keeps them immature is 
laziness, cowardice and money. I need not think if I 
have a book that thinks for me. And, famously, I have 
no need to think, if only I can pay. Kant’s motto 
resonates very well with modern strategies of 
education, especially the idea of life-long education. 
Being able to think for oneself is to set oneself 
intellectual goals, find means to achieve and pursue 
them independently of the influence of the others. It 
is important that developing intellectual autonomy at 
the same time is overcoming one’s intellectual vices, 
such as intellectual laziness and intellectual 
cowardice. Intellectual autonomy presupposes many 
other intellectual traits such as open-mindedness, 
intellectual courage, intellectual humility, and is 
opposed to such vices as conformity, dogmatism and 
wishful thinking. If I want to be intellectually 
autonomous I will be open to accept any result, 
challenge any authority, at the same time realistic 
evaluation of my progress, investigate every available 
cognitive option. I will lean away from conforming 
with a false but accepted view. I will believe 
something just because it would be very nice if it 
were true. Thus, intellectual autonomy can be viewed 
as a cardinal intellectual virtue. The importance of 
epistemic autonomy is stressed by Pritchard: “The 
pupil who has highly developed cognitive abilities 
and who can deal with epistemic unfriendly 
conditions has a self-reliance that pupils who depend 
on the right kind of helpful conditions being in play 
before they can have knowledge lack. Epistemic 
autonomy is arguably a good thing in its own right, 
regardless of what further epistemic benefits it might 
bring” (Pritchard, 2013). Correspondingly, 
developing it should become the highest goal of 
education. Intellectual autonomy can be considered 
as a synonym for cognitive agency. When I am 
autonomous I am no longer just an object for the 
influence of others, beneficiary or not. I am no longer 
passive, I become active and assume cognitive 
agency. 
 
5. Educating intellectual virtues. 
Theoretical and practical aspects of education 
are not always easily reconciled. The main issue here 
is: can intellectual virtues be taught? This turns the 
discussion from theoretical to practical sphere. 
Intellectual character is not nurtured by repeated 
exhortations: “try to be curious” or “show open-
mindedness”. If asked explicitly, students will 
maintain that they are open-minded, critical, and 
intellectually autonomous. And no one will admit 
that they are intellectually lazy or coward. Baehr 
proposes several strategies of nurturing intellectual 
character (Baehr, 2013). Firstly, institutional culture 
should be amended generally to include the 
commitment to education of virtues. This 
commitment should be reflected in the official 
mission of the educational institution, hiring faculty, 
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public relations, development of carricula, etc. The 
second strategy is direct instruction in intellectual 
virtue concepts and terminology with series of 
instructional lessons on what intellectual virtues are. 
The third strategy is to deliberately invoke self-
reflection and self-assessment at class or at 
homework.  The fourth strategy is to make explicit 
connections between the course material and 
intellectual virtues. To this it is usually added that 
teachers must manifest intellectual virtues 
themselves, so that students learn by imitating the 
example. In this article, however, we would like to 
pay special attention to the Russian tradition of 
“developmental education” by Elkonin and Davydov 
(Davydov, 1996, Elkonin, 2001). We will see that the 
ideas, propagated in by American philosophers in the 
80-90-ies of the previous century were anticipated by 
the Russian philosophers, psychologists and 
educational theorists in the 50-60-ies of the previous 
century. Elkonin and Davydov claimed that the aim 
of education is the development of cognitive 
faculties, their mastering and reproduction, and not 
transference of knowledge and its reproduction. 
Education is the form of activity which results in the 
change in the student as the subject of learning. This 
change is manifested in the development of 
theoretical thinking which includes reflection, 
formulation of goals, planning, ability to exchange 
products of knowledge. These ideas have much in 
common with the tradition of VE. This commonality 
is even more interesting, considering the cultural 
environment of their emergence (50-ies in the Soviet 
Union and 90-ies of the liberal West). But these 
traditions have one main difference. For VE the 
social character of knowledge presents a challenge 
which demands determining those sources of 
knowledge which are trustworthy. For Elkonin and 
Davydov cooperation between individuals in 
acquiring knowledge is considered as the prime 
condition of development of personal traits 
(including intellectual traits). This cooperation 
includes not only “teacher-student” interaction, but 
also “student-student” interaction. This cooperation 
forms the environment where an individual acquires 
capacity for self-reflection and self-control. The 
cooperation produces incentives for self-education, 
which contributes to intellectual autonomy. It is 
important for the learners to realize that their 
education is socially important and praiseworthy. 
Through cooperation the learner is educated to ask 
meaningful questions to peers and teachers, to 
participate in discussions, and initiate those 
discussions. Thus, the external interaction of students 
translates itself into internal faculties of the 
individual. The teacher is considered as an authority 
and, therefore, is rarely subject to criticism. But in 
the process of critical evaluation of the peers students 
learn to critically evaluate themselves. The self-
reflection here results from viewing oneself through 
the eyes of the others. 
 
6. Conclusions. 
In this article we explored connections between 
the main version of contemporary virtue 
epistemology and education. VE focuses on cognitive 
agency and intellectual character. The agent is 
intellectually virtuous if her cognitive agency 
significantly contributes to her beliefs. Virtue 
reliabilism stresses the role of first-and-second order 
cognitive faculties for knowledge. The importance of 
cultivating cognitive faculties was shown in the case 
of hostile epistemic environment. Knowledge is 
considered as an achievement which can be credited 
to the knower. We explored how testimonial 
knowledge can be a challenge to VE. It was shown 
that this challenge can be answered by either shifting 
the emphasis on the role of epistemic environment or 
by defining the virtuous traits of the testimony-giver 
and testimony-taker. In discussion of virtue 
responsibilism we emphasized the role of intellectual 
autonomy as cardinal intellectual virtue. We saw that 
it presupposes many other intellectual virtues and that 
its importance was praised by Kant. We outlined 
briefly several strategies that were proposed for 
educating intellectual virtues. We compared VE with 
the tradition of “developmental education” of 
Elkonin and Davydov and saw much in common. The 
difference of Russian tradition is that it stresses the 
importance of mutual cooperation between students 
in fostering intellectual character traits, such as self-
reflection and autonomy. 
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